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The tension between "rescaling for economic reasons" and "local democracy" is one of the major issues in metropolitan governance [1] . In Europe, this tension was addressed in 1985, with the European Charter of Local Self Government. Article 4 of the charter defines the appropriate scale as follows: "Public responsibilities shall generally be exercised, in preference, by those authorities who are closest to the citizen. Allocation of responsibility to another authority should weigh up the extent and nature of the task and requirements of efficiency and economy". It is also stated that "Powers given to local authorities shall normally be full and exclusive. They may not be undermined or limited by another, central or regional, authority except as provided for by the law". If this definition provided a universally recognized criterion, there would have been less confusion about the "optimal scale" which would balance economic and democratic necessities. However, this is not the case. Each country in different regions of the world has developed administrative designs in their own context [2] [3] . Although the consequences may be different, one can still identify two main streams which were more or less commonly experienced on a global scale in the last two decades: 1) expansion of the metropolitan areas; and 2) introduction of new public management measures to confront fiscal and democratic challenges [3] . These two streams have also been experienced in Turkey. With the latest law about metropolitan municipalities (Act no. 6360), almost 50 percent of the country's total area, and almost 73 percent of the total population will be living in metropolitan municipalities in 2014. This unprecedented rescaling of metropolitans has revitalized the problem of the "optimal scale" in Turkish local government system.
In this paper we discuss the latest expansion of metropolitan municipalities on the basis of subsidiarity principle. We argue that the local government system is becoming recentralized around metropolitan cities for the sake of benefiting "scale economies", and that this centralization conflicts with democratic principles on which the local governments are build upon. The remaining of the paper is organized in three sections. In the second section we summarize the expansion of the metropolitan municipalities. We also provide the main arguments in favour of rescaling as stated in the preambles of Act No 5216 and Act No 6360. In the third section, we discuss the recentralization on metropolitan scale and argue that democratic subsidiarity principle has been eroded in favour of economic rescaling. In the final section we conclude our discussion and make recommendations about further studies.
Expansion of Metropolitan Municipalities
The first metropolitan municipalities (Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir) in Turkey were established in 1984. Since then, both the number and the responsibility areas of the metropolitan municipalities has gradually increased. After extensive local government reforms since 2004, new public management measures such as decentralization, privatization, public/private partnerships, and development of tighter financial control mechanism have accompanied spatial expansion. During 1980s and 1990s, the debate about the optimal balance between scaling and local democracy was coupled with a debate about the extensive tutelage powers of central government over local governments in Turkey. In parallel to the extensive reforms in public administration since 2004, major local government laws have been changed to decrease the power of central government while empowering local governments. As stated in the Emergency Action Plan and the Public Administration Basic Law drafts of the newly elected government, (Justice and Development Party, which is still in power in Turkey) decentralization for the sake of democratization was one of the top priorities. The reforms were also in line with the European Charter of Local Self Government, as well as the dominant new public management paradigm [4] . Decentralization was also accompanied with two waves of expansion of the metropolitan municipalities. First wave was in 2004, when the responsibility area of the metropolitans was increased according to their populations with the Metropolitan Municipalities Law (Act No. 5216). The second, and bigger, wave was in 2012 with the legislation (Act no 6360) which established 14 more metropolitan municipalities, and expanded the metropolitan municipality borders to provincial borders. As a result of this law, the metropolitan population will increase from 47% to 73% of the national population, and the metropolitan municipality areas will increase from 30% to 50% of the country's total area in 2014, when the articles related to expansion will be effective after the local elections (see, Appendix-1).
The preambles of Act no. 5216 and Act No. 6360 explain the main reasons (among others) of rescaling as avoiding problems about planning and coordination among too many units, benefiting economies of scale, inadequate capacity and financial weakness of small size municipalities, inefficient and unproductive administration, lack of qualified workers in small units, etc. It is argued that large scale local governments may provide quality public services, and may bring about fair distribution of resources. The right scale of the metropolitan municipalities is also provided in the preamble of Act No 5216 with reference to the subsidiarity principle. The scale for establishing a metropolitan municipality is based on population criterion which should be at least one million (This population size was rolled back to 750 thousand in the final text of the law). As stated in the preamble, sub-level or district municipalities within the metropolitan municipality should provide local common services which do not have effects outside their own borders, while the metropolitan municipality should provide services that require metropolitan planning and coordination or require metropolitan municipality due to financial reasons. The services which could be provided by the sub-level municipalities but which could also cause conflicts in practice will be provided by the metropolitan municipality. It is claimed that this distribution of functions will not only guarantee objectivity in practice but also realize the principle of subsidiarity. The preamble of Act No 6360 is clearer about the ideal, optimal, and bigger scale. In order to provide efficient, productive, and quality public service, the metropolitan municipality should cover the whole province.
Democratic Subsidiarity versus Recentralization
In 2014, 30 special provincial administrations, 1.591 smaller municipalities, and 16.082 villages will be dissolved as a result of the expansion of the 30 metropolitan municipalities to provincial borders. In these provinces, dissolved municipalities and villages will become neighborhoods (mahalle), an administrative unit which has no legal entity. Moreover, all the existing district municipalities in the province will become metropolitan district municipalities.
Dissolution of village administrations and sub-district municipalities has been criticized in numerous studies. For example Gozler [5] states that this is a clear violation of the subsidiarity principle. He claims this will lead to eradication of regional and local diversity, removal of decision making to distant municipalities, and inconsistencies due to different needs of urban and rural populations. On the other hand, Guler [6] argues that the residents of the dissolved administrative units have not been counseled, informed, or asked whether they wanted to be a part of another municipality. However, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2013 that the legislation was not inconsistent with the Constitution. An earlier decision of the court about the dissolution of small local government (sub-district municipalities and villages) units in order to provide more efficient and productive public services also stated that dissolving local governments due to economic scaling was not a violation of the local people's wills. So, as far as the Constitutional Court decisions are concerned, the expansion of metropolitan municipalities for economic re-scaling does not contradict with the subsidiarity principle.
We argue here that the expansion embeds significant degree of recentralization, and the locus of this recentralization is the metropolitan municipality. When the borders of the metropolitan municipality expand, its powers also expand. We can outline the main powers of metropolitan municipalities as listed below:
• Determining strategic plan priorities, • Allocation of resources within the metropolitan municipality, • Selective financial support to metropolitan district municipalities, • Authority in disputes among metropolitan district municipalities, • Extensive authority in planning
The power of the metropolitans is also reinforced by dissolution of special provincial administrations. The metropolitan municipality assembly becomes the only province-wide elected assembly after the dissolution of the provincial general assembly of the special provincial administrations. Thus it becomes the only channel to seek support for the sub-level municipalities. Moreover, the municipality model in Turkey is based on a "strong mayor/weak assembly" approach. With the latest legislation, the metropolitan mayor becomes the only provincewide directly elected representative. So, it could be claimed that the power will be concentrated in the hands of metropolitan mayors. Although we focus on recentralization on metropolitan level, it is also possible to claim that the central government becomes more powerful, too. Sectorial recentralization, Investment Monitoring and Coordination Office, Regional Development Agencies, and the political relationships between the mayors and the central government add to further weakening of district municipalities [7] [8].
So, what does a stronger province-wide metropolitan municipality and stronger central government units mean in terms of subsidiarity? We can safely suggest that the decision making has been removed to distant assemblies. One can also identify a reversal of the decentralizing reforms of the early 2000s. It seems the big problems of the metropolitans are tried to be solved by making them bigger. However, this also makes the smaller local government units much weaker. Dissolution of local government units with laws, or decrees without listening to locals' demands may be considered as opposing subsidiarity. It is also problematic to dissolve legal entities, and cultures of villages which are the only local government units that exercise direct democracy as well as sub-district municipalities that are the main school of democracy for people living in smaller settlements. Whether the provincial border is the optimal scale for metropolitan municipalities is yet to be seen. If the expanded metropolitan municipalities can provide better public services with lower costs to citizens who reside both in urban and rural areas while still nurturing local democracy, then its optimality will be approved. However, until that future, there is need to discuss the consequences of rescaling metropolitans in order to identify inclinations which may deteriorate the democratic gains of the decentralizing local government reforms which were brought about by the same government a decade ago after great struggles. Here we presented the expansion of metropolitan municipalities, and argued that the powers of the metropolitan municipalities have significantly increased. Even if the optimal scales have been established for service delivery, there seem to be vital problems about local democracy. Further studies must closely monitor the consequences of the expansion in terms of service delivery and local participation.
